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EMPLOYERS ARE NOT FRIENDS WITH 
FACEBOOK: HOW THE NLRB IS 
PROTECTING EMPLOYEES’ SOCIAL MEDIA 
ACTIVITY 
INTRODUCTION 
Among the multitude of technological changes over the past few years 
was the explosion of social media.1 Social media platforms like Facebook 
and Twitter have grown so popular that they substantially influence 
everyday life. 2  As of June 2012, Facebook had more than 995 million 
monthly active users with over 550 million logging in every day,3  and 
Twitter had approximately 500 million registered users, whose exponential 
growth sees 100 million users logging in each day.4 From the blockbuster 
success of The Social Network5 to Facebook and Twitter’s contributions to 
the Arab Spring revolutions,6 social media has already noticeably affected 
society and continues to do so.7 Likewise, the workplace is not immune 
from the influence of social media. 
In November 2010, in what labor officials and lawyers view as a 
“ground-breaking case,” 8  the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) 
claimed that under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or Act) it is 
“protected activity” for an employee to criticize a supervisor on Facebook.9 
The NLRA protects employees’ right to discuss “terms and conditions of 
their employment with co-workers and others.”10 This case started what has 
                                                                                                                                             
 1. See Robert B. Fitzpatrick, Social Media and Privacy in the Workplace, in 2 ALI-ABA 
COURSEBOOK: CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN EMPLOYMENT LAW: THE OBAMA YEARS AT MID-
TERM 2123, 2130 (2011). 
 2. See id.  
 3. Key Facts, FACEBOOK, http://newsroom.fb.com/content/default.aspx?NewsAreaId=22 (last 
visited Sept. 27, 2012). 
 4. See Shea Bennett, Just How Big is Twitter in 2012?, ALL TWITTER (Feb. 23, 2012, 6:00 
AM), http://www.mediabistro.com/alltwitter/twitter-statistics-2012_b18914; see Lauren Dugan, 
Unofficial Reports Suggest Twitter Surpassed 500M Registered Users in June, ALL TWITTER 
(July 31, 2012, 10:00 AM), http://www.mediabistro.com/alltwitter/twitter-500-million-registered 
-users_b26104. 
 5. The Social Network is a movie about the creation of Facebook that received three Oscars. 
See Fitzpatrick, supra note 1, at 2130.  
 6. See, e.g., Mike Giglio, Tunisia Protests: The Facebook Revolution, THE DAILY BEAST 
(Jan. 15, 2011, 6:29 AM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2011/01/15/tunisa-protests-the 
-facebook-revolution.html; Luke Allnutt, Tunisia: Can We Please Stop Talking About ‘Twitter 
Revolutions’?, TANGLED WEB BLOG, http://www.rferl.org/content/tunisia_can_we_please_stop 
_talking_about_twitter_revolutions/2277052.html (last visited Dec. 20, 2011); Ari Melber, Can 
Egypt’s Internet Movement be Exported?, THE NATION (Feb. 18, 2011), http://www.thenation 
.com/print/article/158717/can-egypts-internet-movement-be-exported. 
 7. See Giglio, supra note 6; Allnutt, supra note 6.  
 8. See Steven Greenhouse, Company Accused of Firing over Facebook Post, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 8, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/09/business/09facebook.html. 
 9. See id.  
 10. Settlement Reached in Case Involving Discharge for Facebook Comments, NLRB (Feb. 8, 
2011), http://www.nlrb.gov/news/settlement-reached-case-involving-discharge-facebook 
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become, and will likely continue to be, a pattern of charges filed by the 
NLRB against employers that discipline employees for discussing 
employment issues via social media.11 
The “Facebook Firing” case—as the media has coined it12—and the 
social media cases that have followed13 will likely have a profound impact 
on the corporate world. As social media use remains prevalent and 
widespread, employees will undoubtedly continue to use social media 
platforms to express their feelings about supervisors, co-workers, and other 
aspects of their jobs. In an effort to protect their reputation and 
organizational culture, corporations will likely terminate many employees 
for posting certain comments on social media websites. The Facebook 
Firing case has shown that such employer action may have significant 
consequences.14 But the NLRB’s inconsistent pattern of choosing to pursue 
certain cases that followed the Facebook Firing case while refusing others 
has created uncertainty as to when social media postings will be protected 
and when they will not.15 
In the near future, if not currently, all employers will need social media 
policies for their employees,16 but they must be careful when enforcing 
those policies.17 On one hand, employers do not want to face the costs of 
                                                                                                                                             
-comments. 
 11. See When Can Employers Fire You for Facebook, Twitter?, TECH AND TREND (Sept. 6, 
2011), http://www.ibtimes.com/articles/220171/20110926/facebook-twitter-national-labor 
-relations-board.htm; see also Think You Can’t Fire over a Facebook Post? Think Again, 
NOTATIONS ON NON-PROFITS (July 30, 2011), http://www.notationsonnonprofits.com/recent 
-law/think-you-cant-fire-over-a-facebook-post-think-again/. 
 12. See Melanie Trottman, Facebook Firing Case is Settled, WALL ST. J., Feb. 7, 2011, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704422204576130631738779412.html. 
 13. See, e.g., Bay SYS Technologies, LLC, 357 N.L.R.B. 28 (2011) (detailing a social media 
case brought by the NLRB following the Facebook Firing case); Hispanics United of Buffalo, 
Inc., No. 3-CA-27872, 2011 WL 3894520 (N.L.R.B. Div. of Judges, Sept. 2 2011); Karl Knauz 
Motors, Inc., No. 13-CA-46452, 2011 WL 4499437 (N.L.R.B. Div. of Judges, Sept. 28, 2011); 
N.L.R.B., MEMORANDUM OM 11-74, REPORT OF THE ACTING GENERAL COUNSEL CONCERNING 
SOCIAL MEDIA CASES (2011) [hereinafter MEMORANDUM OM 11-74] (on file with author). 
 14. See Greenhouse, supra note 8; see also Trottman, supra note 12 (discussing employer in 
the Facebook Firing case settling privately with the employee on undisclosed terms, but forced to 
rewrite its employee rules).  
 15. Compare Karl Knauz Motors, 2011 WL 4499437 (pursuing charges based on the NLRB’s 
contention that certain postings, both with and without comments from others, were “concerted”), 
with NLRB. Gen. Couns. Adv. Mem., Case No. 17-CA-25030 (July 19, 2011) [hereinafter Wal-
Mart Advice Memorandum] (advising the dismissal of charges because a post was not 
“concerted,” despite the fact that the post garnered many comments and support from others and 
seemed to be inducing group action). 
 16. See, e.g., David Gevertz & Gina Greenwood, Crafting an Effective Social Media Policy for 
Healthcare Employers, 22 No. 6 HEALTH L. 28, 30–32 (2010) (describing how to draft effective 
social media policies in the healthcare industry to prevent risks of employee inappropriateness on 
social networking sites). See generally Kellen A. Hade, Not All Lawyers are Antisocial: Social 
Media Regulation and the First Amendment, 2011 J. PROF. L. 133 (2011) (exploring social media 
policies for attorneys). 
 17. See Nancy J. King, Labor Law for Managers of Non-Union in Traditional and Cyber 
Workplaces, 40 AM. BUS. L.J. 827 (2003). 
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carefully monitoring their employees’ social media use, and even worse, the 
spiraling litigation costs that will result from wrongfully disciplining 
employees.18 On the other hand, employers want the discretion to make 
employment decisions when employees disparage their co-workers or harm 
the employers’ reputation through social media.19 
This note argues that the NLRB misapplies old law to a new and 
distinct context by broadly defining employees’ social media use as 
“protected concerted activity” under Section 7 of the NLRA. Without clear 
precedent from the NLRB on when social media activity is protected, 
employers will face a dilemma when an employee complains via social 
media: terminate the employee and live with the potential repercussions of 
high litigation costs, or do nothing and hope it does not affect public 
relations, productivity, or organizational culture. However, it is inevitable 
that, in an effort to protect their reputation and corporate culture, some 
employers will terminate employees for social media postings. These 
corporations unfortunately have an unknown fate. In light of this problem, 
Congress should take a proactive approach and amend the Act. Waiting for 
tribunals to establish precedent on this issue will take years or even 
decades, and the last thing employers and employees need in this economic 
climate is uncertainty.20 An amendment to this part of the Act has not been 
passed in over sixty years, and there is no better time than now. The 
framework of the employer-employee relationship has been drastically 
transformed since the 1930s and 1940s, when the Act was more properly 
applied to the employment landscape.21 It is time for the Act to conform to 
the current employment landscape and societal realities. 
Part I discusses the Facebook Firing case and how the nature of the 
Internet makes protecting employees’ social media activity different from 
protecting face-to-face or pre-Internet activity. Part II looks into a few 
                                                                                                                                             
 18. See id.  
 19. See PETER J. PIZZI, WHERE CYBER AND EMPLOYMENT LAW INTERSECT, RISKS FOR 
MANAGEMENT ABOUND (West 2011), available at 2011 WL 3020563. 
 20. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit recently held that 
President Obama’s recess appointments of three NLRB members was unconstitutional. Robert 
Barnes & Steven Mufson, Court Says Obama Exceeded Authority in Making Appointments, 
WASH. POST, Jan. 25, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/court-says-obama-exceeded 
-authority-in-making-appointments/2013/01/25/b7e1b692-6713-11e2-9e1b-07db1d2ccd5b_story 
.html. Therefore, the decisions in which those NLRB members participated can potentially be 
challenged. Id. This may cast doubt over recent NLRB decisions, including some social media 
cases, and could “present a quandary for employers about how to comply with the law.” Id. 
However, the effect of the D.C. Circuit’s holding is unknown because as the NLRB Chairman 
stated, the holding only applies to that one case. Id. The NLRB will likely continue prosecuting 
social media cases and the NLRB Chairman indicated that the NLRB will “continue business as 
usual.” Id. The case may also reach the Supreme Court, which would further delay resolution of 
this issue. Id. Thus, the D.C. Circuit’s opinion advances the premise of this note that there is and 
will be great uncertainty surrounding social media cases, and the NLRB will likely continue to 
pursue such cases against employers.  
 21. See, e.g., infra Part I.C. 
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social media cases that followed the Facebook Firing case and how they fail 
to draw a clear line between social media activity that is protected and 
activity that is not protected. Part III examines past NLRB precedent to 
project how broadly the NLRB will define activity as “protected concerted 
activity” in the coming years, and to what extent employee misconduct 
warrants discipline without the employer fearing future litigation costs. 
Lastly, Part IV recommends a solution to the negative consequences that 
these social media cases have on employers. That solution is to amend the 
NLRA. The NLRA is long overdue for modifications and the current 
economic climate and transformation of the employer-employee 
relationship make the time ripe for congressional proactivity. 
I. HOW EMPLOYEES’ SOCIAL MEDIA ACTIVITY HAS A 
GREATER EFFECT ON CORPORATIONS THAN FACE-TO-FACE 
ACTIVITY 
A. THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT AND THE NATIONAL 
LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 
The NLRA was established to protect America’s labor force, as a 
reaction to minimal restrictions on employers and growing labor unrest.22 
Congress passed the NLRA in 1935, guaranteeing employees certain rights, 
including the right to organize and bargain collectively. 23  In order to 
enforce the rights guaranteed by the NLRA, Section 3 of the NLRA 
established the NLRB and its powers. 24  The NLRB has two branches: 
judicial and prosecutorial.25 The judicial branch,  referred to in this note as 
the Board, is a group of five individuals based in Washington, D.C. who act 
in a judicial capacity.26 They are appointed by the President to a five-year 
term and are affirmed by the Senate.27 The other branch is the General 
Counsel, which is the prosecutorial side of the NLRB.28  
The NLRB has offices across the country and is responsible for 
investigating and prosecuting parties that engage in unfair labor practices.29 
                                                                                                                                             
 22. Description of National Labor Relations Act, IBEW LOCAL 1613, 
http://home.earthlink.net/~local1613/nlra.html (last visited Nov. 26, 2011). 
 23. See, e.g., National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (1935), available at 
http://www.nlrb.gov/national-labor-relations-act. “The provisions of the NLRA were later 
expanded under the Taft-Hartley Labor Act of 1957 and the Landrum-Griffin Act of 1959.” 
National Labor Relations Act (1935), OURDOCUMENTS.GOV, http://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc 
.php?flash=false&doc=67 (last visited Dec. 20, 2011). 
 24. 29 U.S.C. § 153.  
 25. See National Labor Relations Board, INC.COM, http://www.inc.com/encyclopedia/national 
-labor-relation-board-nlrb.html (last visited Dec. 20, 2011). 
 26. Id.  
 27. See What We Do – Decide Cases, NLRB, https://www.nlrb.gov/what-we-do/decide-cases 
(last visited Dec. 20, 2011). 
 28. See National Labor Relations Board, supra note 25. 
 29. Id.  
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This process begins when an employee, union, or employer files a “charge” 
(a claim) with a Regional Office of the NLRB. 30  Then, after an 
investigation, the NLRB decides whether to issue a complaint or dismiss 
the charge.31 If the NLRB pursues the case, the case is brought before an 
administrative law judge (ALJ), a neutral public official who decides 
whether the accused party committed an unfair labor practice.32 The ALJ’s 
decision can be appealed to the Board.33 Board decisions can be appealed to 
an appropriate United States Court of Appeals, which can in turn be 
appealed to the United States Supreme Court.34 The NLRB and the Board 
were designed to be a neutral “referee,” favoring neither the employer nor 
the employee.35 
The purpose of the NLRB is to protect the rights of employees as 
specified in the NLRA.36 These rights are set forth in Section 7 of the 
NLRA, which states: 
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist 
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their 
own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose 
of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also 
have the right to refrain from any or all such activities except to the extent 
that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in 
a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in section 
8(a)(3).37 
If employees’ rights have been violated, the NLRB can file an unfair 
labor practice charge against the employer38 pursuant to Section 8 of the 
NLRA.39 Specifically, Section 8(a)(1) protects employees’ Section 7 rights 
                                                                                                                                             
 30. See Meghan Brooke Phillips, Using the Employee Free Choice Act as Duct Tape: How 
Both Active and Passive Deregulation of Labor Law Make the EFCA an Improper Mechanism for 
Remedying Working Class Americans’ Problems, 111 W. VA. L. REV. 219, 238 (2008) (citation 
omitted).  
 31. See id.  
 32. See id.  
 33. See, e.g., id. (describing the process of charges filed with the NLRB); What We Do – 
Decide Cases, supra note 27.  
 34. See What We Do – Decide Cases, supra note 27. 
 35. See id.; see also National Labor Relations Board, supra note 25.   36.  OUR DOCUMENTS, http://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=false&doc=67 (last 
visited Dec. 20, 2011). 
 37. National Labor Relations Act § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1935), available at http://www.nlrb 
.gov/national-labor-relations-act. 
 38. If an employee believes his or her rights have been violated by an employer or labor 
organization, he or she can file a charge with the NLRB. See What We Do – Investigate Charges, 
NLRB, https://www.nlrb.gov/what-we-do/investigate-charges (last visited Dec. 20, 2011). Then 
the NLRB will investigate the charge and determine whether it is valid and should be pursued. See 
National Labor Relations Board, supra note 25. Before the NLRB issues a complaint, many 
charges are withdrawn or settled. Id. If a complaint is filed, typically there is a full hearing before 
an NLRB Administrative Law Judge, which is subject to review by the Board. See What We Do – 
Decide Cases, supra note 27.  
 39. See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169. 
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by stating that “[i]t shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer . . . to 
interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights 
guaranteed in Section 7.” 40  In social media cases, the NLRB typically 
brings charges against the employer for violating Section 8(a)(1), which 
protects union and nonunion employees.41 
B. THE FACEBOOK FIRING CASE: STARTING A TREND 
The Facebook Firing case was the first case in which the NLRB 
determined that employees’ criticisms of their supervisors or employers on 
social networking sites are protected activities under the NLRA. 42  The 
NLRB filed a complaint against American Medical Response of 
Connecticut for violating what it claimed was protected activity when an 
employee was terminated for criticizing her supervisor on the employee’s 
Facebook page.43 The employee used vulgarities in mocking her supervisor 
on Facebook and referred to him as a “psychiatric patient.”44 This Facebook 
post received comments by her co-workers who demonstrated their 
support.45 The employee was later terminated.46 
The NLRB believed the post was “protected concerted activity” under 
Section 7 of the NLRA, and by terminating the employee for engaging in 
such activity, the employer violated Section 8(a)(1).47 The NLRB argued 
that the post was “concerted” because other co-workers commented on the 
post and showed support, 48  and that this was “protected” because it 
criticized a supervisor with respect to “wages, hours and working 
conditions.”49 The NLRB and American Medical Response of Connecticut 
eventually settled the claim.50 Commenting on the case, the director of the 
NLRB’s Hartford office said, “You’re allowed to talk about your supervisor 
with your co-workers. You’re allowed to communicate the concerns and 
criticisms you have. The only difference in this case is she did it on 
Facebook and did it on her own time using her own computer.”51 However, 
there is a vast difference between face-to-face communication and 
communication via social networking. 
                                                                                                                                             
 40. See id. § 158(a).  
 41. See, e.g., id. §§ 151–169; Bay SYS Technologies, LLC, 357 N.L.R.B. 28 (2011); 
Hispanics United of Buffalo, Inc., No. 3-CA-27872, 2011 WL 3894520 (N.L.R.B. Div. of Judges, 
Sept. 2 2011); Karl Knauz Motors, Inc., No. 13-CA-46452, 2011 WL 4499437 (N.L.R.B. Div. of 
Judges, Sept. 28, 2011); MEMORANDUM OM 11-74, supra note 13.  
 42. See Greenhouse, supra note 8; Trottman, supra note 12; Fitzpatrick, supra note 1.  
 43. See Greenhouse, supra note 8; Trottman, supra note 12.  
 44. See Greenhouse, supra note 8; Trottman, supra note 12.  
 45. See Greenhouse, supra note 8; Trottman, supra note 12.  
 46. See Greenhouse, supra note 8; Trottman, supra note 12. 
 47. See Greenhouse, supra note 8; Trottman, supra note 12. 
 48. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1935); Greenhouse, supra note 8.  
 49. 29 U.S.C. § 157; Greenhouse, supra note 8.  
 50. Trottman, supra note 12. 
 51. Greenhouse, supra note 8. 
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C. THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN PROTECTING SOCIAL MEDIA 
ACTIVITY AND FACE-TO-FACE ACTIVITY 
Social media use in the employment context is particularly significant 
because of the way the Internet’s distinctive characteristics changed the 
nature of the workplace.52 The Internet opens “a gateway to the outside 
world—beyond the walls of the corporation—that has had, and will 
continue to have, far-reaching effects.”53 Social media makes it easier for 
employees to bring their workplace issues home with them and discuss such 
issues with their co-workers,54 friends, or even complete strangers. Prior to 
social media, discussing employment problems with co-workers was 
possible through e-mail, the telephone, or old-fashioned face-to-face 
communication. As social media becomes more popular, it appears that 
more employees use social media as their major vehicle for 
communication. 55  However, unlike the other forms of communication, 
social media profiles are easily discovered and more publically accessible.56 
Furthermore, employers are making greater efforts to monitor public posts 
made on social media websites. 57  This is only part of the problem. In 
addition to the employer, other “friends” including peers, competitors, the 
media, and the general public can view what employees post if the 
employee does not restrict his or her privacy settings 58  such that even 
seemingly private social media conversations can end up reaching the 
public.59 The other participant in the conversation, or another user that can 
                                                                                                                                             
 52. PATRICIA WALLACE, THE INTERNET IN THE WORKPLACE: HOW NEW TECHNOLOGY IS 
TRANSFORMING WORK 1 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2004). 
 53. Id. at 2.  
 54. Id.  
 55. See Elizabeth Lupfer, Communicate with Employees Through Social Media, THE SOCIAL 
WORKPLACE (Aug. 24, 2009), http://www.thesocialworkplace.com/2009/08/24/communicate 
-with-employees-through-social-media/. 
 56. Sometimes an employee’s Facebook or Twitter page can be found with a simple Google 
search of the person’s name. See Om Malik, Facebook Opens up to Public Search, GIGAOM (Sep. 
5, 2007, 12:07 AM), http://gigaom.com/2007/09/05/facebook-open-to-public-search/. 
 57. See, e.g., Joshua Brustein, Keeping a Closer Eye on Employees’ Social Networking, N.Y. 
TIMES BITS BLOG (Mar. 26, 2010, 6:51 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/03/26/keeping-a 
-closer-eye-on-workers-social-networking/ (discussing Social Sentry, a company that “draws . . . 
publicly posted information on Facebook and Twitter” when monitoring social media posts for 
employers); Dionne Searcey, Employers Watching Workers Online Spurs Privacy Debate, WALL 
ST. J., April 23, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124045009224646091.html (detailing 
where an employer enters private chatroom and fires employees for the ensuing discussion). 
 58. See Shea Bennett, 10 Must-Learn Lessons for Twitter Newbies, ALL TWITTER (Aug. 6, 
2012. 8:00 AM), http://www.mediabistro.com/alltwitter/10-lessons-twitter-newbies_b10079. 
 59. “That’s the problem with social media. Once you start feeding it posts and images, users 
can send them swirling just about anywhere. You might think you’re just talking to your friends, 
but you don’t really control the conversation, which can take on a breadth and significance you 
hadn’t intended.” Max Fisher, Why is Israel Tweeting Airstrikes?, WASH. POST, Nov. 16, 2012, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/israels-campaign-of-airstrikes-and-tweets/2012/11/16 
/48b17eae-2f75-11e2-9f50-0308e1e75445_story.html (discussing how the Israeli Defense Force’s 
tweets and Facebook posts have been re-posted and shared thousands of times). 
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view the “private” conversation, can re-post it to his or her friends, who can 
in turn re-post it to their friends, and so on.60 The large scale usage of the 
Internet and social media amplifies the possible damage to a corporation 
when employees comment about the workplace.61 This makes a familiar 
problem for a corporation—an employee disparaging his or her employer—
exponentially more harmful for the corporation because of the broad range 
of entities that can view the postings. 
The information posted on social media forums not only reaches a 
broad range of people but could also be permanent, which creates a new 
problem for employers.62 For example, complaints on Facebook about a 
supervisor may be forever traceable.63 In contrast, when the NLRA was 
passed in 1935, fewer people heard employee complaints to co-workers 
about their supervisor, and such statements were probably not recorded at 
all. This unavoidable characteristic of the Internet 64  further broadens 
corporations’ exposure when employees take to social media to discuss 
employment problems.  
The sense of anonymity and guise that people feel when using the 
Internet—justified or unjustified—may cause employees to feel more 
comfortable using social media to air grievances.65 As opposed to speaking 
to a co-worker at the place of employment, where a supervisor might be 
listening, an employee sitting at home behind a computer may be more 
likely to express his or her concerns. 66  Consequently, social media can 
cause employees to discuss employment problems more frequently and 
publically than ever before.  
                                                                                                                                             
 60. Id.  
 61. See, e.g., Internet Usage Statistics, INTERNET WORLD STATS, http://www 
.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm (last visited Dec. 20, 2011) (illustrating global internet usage 
statistics); Mark Zuckerberg, One Billion People on Facebook, FACEBOOK (Oct. 4, 2012), 
http://newsroom.fb.com/News/One-Billion-People-on-Facebook-1c9.aspx. 
 62. See Daniel K. Gelb, Privacy Invasions Last Forever, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2011, 12:53 
PM), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2010/09/30/cyberbullying-and-a-students-suicide 
/privacy-invasions-now-last-forever (discussing the effects of cyber bullying, including the 
permanence of information on the Internet); see also Sarah Hawk, The Internet is Forever, 
SITEPOINT (May 17, 2012), http://www.sitepoint.com/the-internet-is-forever/ (explaining that 
people have asked the blogger to delete their posts because the postings remain on the Internet and 
could have devastating consequences in the future). 
 63. See Hawk, supra note 62.  
 64. See Gelb, supra note 62; Hawk, supra note 62.  
 65. See, e.g., Facebook’s Randi Zuckerberg: Anonymity Online ‘Has To Go Away,’ 
HUFFINGTON POST (July 27, 2011, 1:23 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/07/27/randi 
-zuckerberg-anonymity-online_n_910892.html (calling for anonymity on the Internet to go away 
so people can be held more accountable on social media forums such as Facebook). People often 
would like to be anonymous on the Internet for various reasons; however, the “cloak of online 
anonymity can easily be lifted.” John D. Sutter, The Coming-out Stories of Anonymous Bloggers, 
CNN TECH (Aug. 21, 2009), http://articles.cnn.com/2009-08-21/tech/outing.anonymous.bloggers 
_1_bloggers-online-anonymity-persona?_s=PM.  
 66. See Nancy J. King, Labor Law for Managers of Non-Union in Traditional and Cyber 
Workplaces, 40 AM. BUS. L.J. 827, 828–29 (2003) (explaining that the Internet gives employees 
new ways to air their concerns). 
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These fundamental aspects of the Internet and social media illustrate a 
few important themes. First, the type of activity that the NLRA was 
designed to protect in 1935—employees discussing employment issues—
has dramatically evolved into a more frequent and permanent phenomenon 
that reaches an exponentially larger audience.67 Second, as long as social 
media continues to dominate American culture, the problems associated 
with social media use and employment will grow if they are not adequately 
addressed. 
II. THE NLRB’S APPLICATION OF OLD LAW TO SOCIAL 
MEDIA ACTIVITY HAS CREATED UNCERTAINTY FOR 
EMPLOYERS AND EMPLOYEES AS TO WHEN SOCIAL MEDIA 
ACTIVITY IS PROTECTED 
A. THE NLRB BROADLY INTERPRETS “PROTECTED CONCERTED 
ACTIVITY” AND FINDS EMPLOYEE CONDUCT ON SOCIAL MEDIA 
PROTECTED UNDER THE NLRA 
As technology has developed, people have found different ways to 
communicate with each other.68 Social media platforms like Facebook and 
Twitter are the newest, most popular methods of communication.69 In the 
Facebook Firing case, the NLRB determined that certain communications 
on Facebook are “protected concerted activity.”70  Since that case, there 
have been several similar cases involving employers disciplining or 
terminating employees based on social media activity. 71  These cases 
broadly define “protected concerted activity” and have inconsistent 
outcomes, causing two major problems: (1) uncertainty for employers and 
employees as to when social media activity is protected; and (2) adverse 
consequences for employers who attempt to protect their corporation’s 
reputation or organizational culture. 
The NLRB has taken the position that Facebook posts that are 
commented on by co-workers can be deemed a form of “concerted” 
activity. 72  And the NLRB Division of Judges—the ALJs—agree with 
                                                                                                                                             
 67. See, e.g., Internet Usage Statistics, supra note 61 (illustrating the vast amount of internet 
users); Zuckerberg, supra note 61; Gelb, supra note 62. 
 68. See WALLACE, supra note 52.  
 69. See, e.g., Key Facts, supra note 3; Bennett, supra note 4; see also Dugan, supra note 4. 
 70. See Settlement Reached in Case Involving Discharge for Facebook Comments, supra note 
10. 
 71. See, e.g., Bay SYS Technologies, LLC, 357 N.L.R.B. 28 (2011) (discussing how an 
employer terminated his employee for commenting on co-workers’ Facebook pages about the 
employer making late payments); Hispanics United of Buffalo, Inc., No. 3-CA-27872, 2011 WL 
3894520 (N.L.R.B. Div. of Judges, Sept. 2 2011); Karl Knauz Motors, Inc., No. 13-CA-46452, 
2011 WL 4499437 (N.L.R.B. Div. of Judges, Sept. 28, 2011); see also MEMORANDUM OM 11-74, 
supra note 13. 
 72. Hispanics United of Buffalo, 2011 WL 3894520, at *7–9. 
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them.73 In Hispanics United, five employees of a nonprofit social services 
provider were terminated for posting comments on Facebook. 74  The 
terminations arose out of a domestic violence advocate’s conversation with 
a co-worker about how she believed some employees of the nonprofit 
corporation were underperforming.75 The co-worker posted on Facebook 
what the advocate told her and within a few hours, four employees had 
responded with their feelings about their own job performances. 76  For 
example, one employee said, “What the Hell, we don’t have a life as is, 
What else can we do???”77 Another said, “Tell her to come do mt[my] 
f****** job n c if I don’t do enough, this is just dum.”78 The advocate saw 
the posts and commented that the original post was a lie. 79  She later 
complained about the incident to the Executive Director.80 The Executive 
Director terminated all five employees because their comments constituted 
“bullying and harassment” of the advocate. 81  The ALJ disagreed, 
concluding that the nonprofit corporation interfered with the employees’ 
Section 7 rights in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA and ordered the 
nonprofit corporation to reinstate the employees and make them whole for 
their lost earnings and benefits, with interest.82 
The ALJ applied Board precedent and held that the employees’ activity 
was concerted.83 The ALJ cited the Meyers line of cases, which explains 
that “concerted activities” protected by Section 7 are those “engaged in with 
or on the authority of other employees, and not solely by and on behalf of 
the employee himself.”84 The ALJ stated that “the activities of a single 
employee in enlisting support of fellow employees in mutual aid and 
protection is as much concerted activity as is ordinary group activity.”85 
Further, the ALJ held that “individual action is concerted so long as it is 
                                                                                                                                             
 73. Id.; see MEMORANDUM OM 11-74, supra note 13.  
 74. Id. at *6–7. It should be noted that the Board recently affirmed the ALJ’s decision in this 
case. Hispanics United of Buffalo, Inc., 359 N.L.R.B. 1, 1 (2012). Specifically, the Board 
“decided to affirm the judge’s rulings, findings, and conclusions and to adopt the recommended 
Order.” Id. 
 75. Id. at *4, 6–7. 
 76. Id. at *4–5.    77.   Id. at *5.    78.  Id. (spelling error from “mt” to “my” was made in the decision, and the curse word 
“f******” was censored in this note due to its inappropriateness, although spelled out fully in the 
decision).  
 79. Id. at *6.  
 80. Id.  
 81. Id.  
 82. Id. at *9.  
 83.  Id. at *7–9. 
 84. Id. at *7 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Meyers Indus. (Meyers I), 268 N.L.R.B. 
493 (1984), rev’d sub nom. Prill v. NLRB, 755 F.2d 941 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied 474 U.S. 
948 (1985), on remand Meyers Indus. (Meyers II), 281 U.S. 882 (1986), aff’d. sub nom. Prill v. 
NLRB, 835 F.2d 1481 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied 487 U.S. 1205 (1988)).  
 85. Id.  
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engaged in with the object of initiating or inducing group action.”86 Since 
the charging employee’s original Facebook post was an appeal to her co-
workers for assistance, the activity was “concerted” under Section 7 of the 
NLRA. 87  The employees’ postings were protected because they were 
complaining about working conditions—comments by a co-worker about 
their job performance.88 
Lastly, the ALJ applied the Atlantic Steel test89 to determine whether 
the employees forfeited their protection under the NLRA for engaging in 
misconduct (here, cursing) during the course of their protected activity.90 
The factors considered under the Atlantic Steel test are: “(1) the place of the 
discussion; (2) the subject matter of the discussion; (3) the nature of the 
employee’s outburst; and (4) whether the outburst was, in any way, 
provoked by an employer’s unfair labor practice.” 91  Based on a broad 
interpretation of the Atlantic Steel test, the ALJ—ignoring the curse words 
and sarcastic undertones of the Facebook posts—determined that the 
postsdid not constitute misconduct to the requisite level that would lose the 
protection of the NLRA.92 
The Hispanics United case indicates that ALJs and the Board will 
squeeze social media cases into Board law that is several decades old.93 Its 
broad reading of “concerted activity” will affect how corporations must deal 
with their employees’ social media activities.94 An employer that is familiar 
with Hispanics United might discipline or terminate an employee for 
commenting on Facebook about job conditions if the comment did not 
garner any responses. However, with the NLRB, the ALJs, and the Board 
applying the Meyers line of cases to social media contexts, an individual 
comment on Facebook “engaged with the object of . . . inducing group 
action” would be considered “concerted activity.” 95  This is a problem 
because despite the statements made by Lafe Solomon, the Acting General 
Counsel of the NLRB who asserted that posting on Facebook is equivalent 
to conversing at a “water cooler,”96 social media communication has glaring 
differences from the traditional workplace communication.97 The popularity 
                                                                                                                                             
 86. Id. (citing Mushroom Trans. Co., 330 F.2d 683 (3d. Cir. 1964); Whittaker Corp., 289 
N.L.R.B. 933 (1988)).  
 87. See MEMORANDUM OM 11-74, supra note 13.  
 88. Hispanics United of Buffalo, 2011 WL 3894520, at *8.  
 89. Id. at *8 (citing Atlantic Steel Co., 245 N.L.R.B. 814 (1979)).  
 90. Id.  
 91. Id.  
 92. Id.  
 93. See generally id.  
 94. Id. at *6.  
 95. Id. at *5.; see also, Karl Knauz Motors, Inc., 358 N.L.R.B. No. 164 1, 16 (2012) (applying 
Meyers to the social media context). 
 96. Edward G. Phillips, A Primer for Nonemployment Lawyers Advising Clients on the 
NLRB’s Treatment of Social Media Cases, TENN. B.J. 30, 31 (2011). 
 97. Brustein, supra note 57. 
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of social media and the anonymous guise of the Internet make employees’ 
comments on social media platforms more likely to garner responses from 
others than they would if the statements were made privately or at the water 
cooler.98 Therefore, the NLRB will deem activity “concerted” more fre-
quently than it has before, further exposing employers to litigation costs 
arising from defending themselves against charges brought by the NLRB. 
Furthermore, the broad access to social media platforms creates a public 
image and reputation problem for corporations that “water cooler talk” 
simply does not.99 In Bay SYS Technologies, a local newspaper published 
Facebook posts made by one employee on other employees’ Facebook 
pages about their employer making late payments to employees.100  The 
Board concluded that the complaints on co-workers’ Facebook pages were 
protected concerted activity.101 After the newspaper published the Facebook 
posts, the employer’s Chief Executive Officer (CEO) learned about the 
posts and emailed the employees, criticizing them for their actions. 102 
Several days later, the employer terminated the employee who made the 
Facebook posts.103 The Board held that the employer committed an unfair 
labor practice by “interfering with, restraining, and coercing employees in 
the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act in violation of 
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.”104 The Board ordered the employer to cease and 
desist 105  from discouraging the employees from engaging in protected 
activity.106 
This case illustrates the public exposure employers could have from 
employee complaints via social media. Although it was possible before the 
Internet and social media for employees to make public complaints, 
employee gripes on social media platforms are inherently public due to the 
expansive reach and popularity of Facebook and Twitter.  For example, 
media outlets, such as the local newspaper in Bay SYS Technologies, can 
                                                                                                                                             
 98. Facebook’s Randi Zuckerberg: Anonymity Online ‘Has to Go Away,’ supra note 65.  
 99. Brustein, supra note 57.  
 100. Bay SYS Technologies, LLC, 357 N.L.R.B. 28, 2 (2011). 
 101. Id.  
 102. Id.  
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105.  
The remedies provided for under the NLRA are not as lucrative as the damages 
available under some individual rights statutes and theories. The remedial provision in 
the NLRA states that if the Board finds an unfair labor practice was committed, it “shall 
issue and cause to be served on such person an order requiring such person to cease and 
desist from such unfair labor practice, and to take such affirmative action including 
reinstatement of employees with or without back pay, as will effect the policies of the 
Act.”  
William R. Corbett, Waiting for the Labor Law of the Twenty-First Century: Everything Old is 
New Again, 23 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 259, 277 n.89 (2002) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 160(c)). 
 106. Bay SYS Technologies, 357 N.L.R.B. at 3. 
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gain access to Facebook and other social media forums.107 Therefore, social 
media creates a higher likelihood that complaints about a corporation or 
workplace discussions will “go viral” and reach an even broader audience, 
exposing the employer to bad press and public relations.108 
B. THE BOARD TAKES A STEP BACK AND FINDS THAT SOME SOCIAL 
MEDIA POSTINGS ARE UNPROTECTED 
Although the NLRB has shown a willingness and proclivity to pursue 
social media cases against employers, the Board has given employers some 
optimism that employees will not have free range when taking their 
employment complaints to Facebook and other social media platforms.109 
However, with such optimism comes uncertainty.110 In Karl Knauz Motors, 
a BMW car dealership held an event to launch a new product and was 
serving hotdogs, cookies, and chips at the event.111 At a meeting before the 
event, some salespeople stated that they felt the food choice was 
inappropriate for the type of brand they were trying to portray to their 
customers.112 Also, some salespeople said that the BMW dealership should 
be “doing more” for the event.113 The charging party, a salesman for the 
BMW dealership, later testified that he and his co-workers were concerned 
that the low quality of food would reflect poorly on the product, customers 
would be less satisfied, and the salespeople would receive lower 
commissions.114 The charging party took pictures of the event and mocked 
it on Facebook with a few comments. 115  A few days later, a different 
salesman at the Land Rover dealership next to the BMW dealership, both 
owned by the employer in the case, allowed a thirteen-year-old boy to sit in 
the driver’s seat, which led to the boy driving the car over his father’s foot 
and into a pond.116 From the BMW dealership, where he could see the 
incident, the charging party took pictures of the car in the pond and posted 
them on Facebook.117 Several co-workers commented on these pictures as 
well.118 Later, the charging party was terminated.119 
                                                                                                                                             
 107. See id. at 2. 
 108. See, e.g., Internet Usage Statistics, supra note 61; Key Facts, supra note 3; BETTER 
BLOGGING FOR BLOGGERS, http://www.betterbloggingforbloggers.com/2010/05/how-to-make 
-blog-post-go-viral-in.html (last visited Dec. 20, 2011). 
 109. See Karl Knauz Motors, Inc., No. 13-CA-46452, 2011 WL 4499437 (N.L.R.B. Div. of 
Judges, Sept. 28, 2011).  
 110. See id.  
 111. Id. at *2. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id.  
 114. Id.  
 115. Id. at *3.  
 116. Id.  
 117. Id. at *3–4.  
 118. Id.  
 119. Id. at *5.  
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The ALJ held that the posts about the BMW event were “concerted” 
activity because co-workers had previously discussed the issue at a 
meeting.120 They were “protected” because the event potentially affected 
the salesman’s commission (“a condition of employment”).121 Although the 
employee posted the photos and comments himself, without other 
salespeople’s comments or input, the ALJ found that his posts were “clearly 
concerted” because “he was vocalizing the sentiments of his co-workers and 
continuing the course of concerted activity that began when the salespeople 
raised their concerns at the staff meeting.”122 However, the ALJ held that 
the postings about the car accident were not concerted or protected because 
they were not on behalf of other co-workers or regarding the salesman’s 
employment conditions.123  Thus, the ALJ held that the termination was 
lawful because it was only based on the postings about the car, rather than 
the protected postings about the BMW event.124 
A year later, the Board ruled on this case and affirmed the ALJ’s 
decision.125 The Board held that the discharge was lawful because it was 
based solely on the employee’s posts concerning the car accident, which 
were not protected.126 But the Board also found it “unnecessary to pass on 
whether the [salesman’s] Facebook posts concerning a marketing event at 
the Respondent’s BMW dealership were protected.”127 This decision may 
further complicate the legal landscape surrounding social media postings. It 
is unlikely that the Board will dissuade the NLRB from pursuing such 
claims against employers, but the Board has refused to add precedent on 
this issue, creating greater uncertainty about whether posts such as the 
salesman’s in Karl Knauz Motors will garner protection.  
Additionally, Karl Knauz Motors demonstrates that ALJs (and maybe 
the Board) are willing to draw the line somewhere between what is 
concerted activity and what is not, but where that line falls in the social 
media context is unclear.128 Like many of the other social media cases, the 
ALJ applied Meyers and its progeny to the facts of the case to determine 
whether the activity was concerted. 129  Yet, it may not be clear to an 
employer whether social media postings by employees “seek to initiate or to 
induce or to prepare for group action” (protected), or whether they are 
                                                                                                                                             
 120. Id. at *8.  
 121. Id. (discussing the issue indicated “concerted” activity, and the fact that because it could 
affect commission indicated that it was “protected” activity since it has to do with wages, a term 
and condition of employment).  
 122. MEMORANDUM OM 11-74, supra note 13. 
 123. Karl Knauz Motors, 2011 WL 4499437, at *9.  
 124. Id.  
 125. Karl Knauz Motors, Inc., 358 N.L.R.B. 1, 1 (2012). 
 126. Id. at 1 n.1.  
 127. Id. at 1.  
 128. Karl Knauz Motors, 2011 WL 4499437, at *9.  
 129. See id. 
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“solely by and on behalf of the employee himself” (not protected).130 It 
appears that comments by co-workers indicate concerted action, but the 
photos and comments about the car accident in Karl Knauz Motors were not 
concerted, despite co-workers posting comments on the pictures. 131 
Therefore, the standard in these social media cases is clear, but its 
application is not. 
The NLRB has dismissed some cases because it determined that certain 
“individual griping” is not concerted activity, thus drawing a line—however 
unclear—between social media postings that are concerted and that are not 
concerted. 132  In one case, a Wal-Mart employee was disciplined for 
complaining about Wal-Mart management on Facebook.133 The posts said, 
“Wuck Falmart! I swear if this tyranny doesn’t end in this store they are 
about to get a wakeup call because lots are about to quit!”134 The post 
elicited a few “hang in there” type responses from co-workers, whom 
accounted for a majority of the employee’s “Facebook friends.” 135  The 
NLRB dismissed the charge because the post was an “individual gripe” and 
the co-workers’ comments suggested that the original post was a “plea for 
emotional support.”136 However, it is understandable for an employer in this 
situation to believe that the NLRB may consider a post constitutes 
“concerted activity” if it states that “lots [of employees are] about to 
quit.”137 Such a statement seems to be inducing group action. Somehow a 
“plea for emotional support”138 is different from “enlisting support of fellow 
employees in mutual aid and protection.”139 The NLRB again attempted to 
draw a line—using the Meyers standard—where social media conduct is not 
concerted.140 
                                                                                                                                             
 130. Charles J. Morris, NLRB Protection in the Nonunion Workplace: A Glimpse at a General 
Theory of Section 7 Conduct, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1673, 1716–17 (1989).  
 131. See Karl Knauz Motors, 2011 WL 4499437, at *9. 
 132. In one case, a restaurant and bar had a corporate policy that waitresses do not share tips 
with bartenders and two bartenders spoke about how the policy was unfair. See JT’s Porch Saloon, 
No. 13-CA-46689, 2011 WL 2960964 (N.L.R.B.G.C., July 7, 2011). Months later, one of the 
bartenders was terminated for complaining on Facebook about the policy and bashing the 
employer’s customers as “rednecks.” Id. at *1–2. The bartender was terminated and there was no 
violation of the NLRA because the bartender was not attempting to induce group action, was not 
conversing with another co-worker, and the post did not arise from the conversation with the co-
bartender months before. Id. at *2–3. In another case, an employee made “insensitive comments 
about the employer’s clientele,” which was not concerted because it was not to a co-worker. See 
Martin House, No. 34-CA-12950, 2011 WL 3223853 (N.L.R.B.G.C. July 19, 2011). 
 133. See Wal-Mart Advice Memorandum, supra note 15.  
 134. See id. at 1.  
 135. See id. at 2.  
 136. See id. at 3.  
 137. Id. at 1.  
 138. Id.  
 139. Hispanics United of Buffalo, Inc., No. 3-CA-27872, 2011 WL 3894520, at *7 (N.L.R.B. 
Div. of Judges, Sept. 2 2011).  
 140. See Wal-Mart Advice Memorandum, supra note 15, at 3.  
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The problem with the NLRB’s handling of these cases is twofold: (1) 
the application of Meyers to social media postings gives employees and 
employers little guidance on when social media activity is concerted;141 and 
(2) broadly defining “protected concerted activity” is inappropriate in a 
social media context where the impact that employee complaints have on 
corporations is significantly greater than in face-to-face contexts. 142 
Therefore, corporations’ exposure in social media litigation is increased 
exponentially due to the large, seemingly anonymous, and permanent nature 
of the Internet and social media.143 Nonetheless, the NLRB has broadly 
defined “protected concerted activity” and applied it to the social media 
context.144 This broad application of Meyers to these cases, along with the 
few cases where social media posts were solely “individual activity,” fails 
to assist employees or their employers in determining when activity is 
“concerted.”145 Corporations also will want to know when an employee’s 
social media activity is so reprehensible that the conduct will not be 
protected by the Act. This will allow corporations to make employment 
decisions as they feel appropriate in their business judgment, without fear 
of defending themselves against the NLRB. 
III. THE BOARD WILL CONTINUE TO BROADLY MISAPPLY 
OLD LAW TO THE SOCIAL MEDIA CONTEXT WHEN 
EMPLOYEES POST COMMENTS THAT ARE DISLOYAL, 
DEFAMATORY, OR DISPARAGE THE EMPLOYER OR ITS 
EMPLOYEES 
Along with the uncertainty surrounding whether social media postings 
are concerted, the NLRB has not given any indication when social media 
postings will rise to a level of misconduct so reprehensible so as to lose 
protection under the NLRA. The NLRB has indicated through its charges 
filed against employers that it will rarely conclude that an employee who 
would have otherwise engaged in protected concerted activity will lose that 
                                                                                                                                             
 141. Compare Karl Knauz Motors, Inc., No. 13-CA-46452, 2011 WL 4499437 (N.L.R.B. Div. 
of Judges, Sept. 28, 2011) (pertaining to an NLRB pursued claim where an employee was 
discharged for posting comments criticizing his employer on Facebook), with Wal-Mart Advice 
Memorandum, supra note 15. (dismissing an employee’s charge against an employer who 
terminated the employee after he criticized his employer on Facebook).  
 142. See, e.g., Internet Usage Statistics, supra note 61; Key Facts, supra note 3.  
 143. See Internet Usage Statistics, supra note 61.  
 144. See, e.g., Bay SYS Technologies, LLC, 357 N.L.R.B. 28 (2011); Hispanics United of 
Buffalo, Inc., 2011 WL 3894520; Karl Knauz Motors, Inc., 2011 WL 4499437; MEMORANDUM 
OM 11-74, supra note 13. 
 145. Compare Karl Knauz Motors, 2011 WL 4499437 (finding an employee’s posts on 
Facebook as “concerted”), with Wal-Mart Advice Memorandum, supra note 15 (dismissing a 
claim because the employee’s Facebook post was solely individual action).  
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protection due to misconduct.146 Even arguably distasteful and disparaging 
statements about supervisors or the corporation will maintain protection.147 
But how far can employees’ statements go without forfeiting protection? 
When can an employer terminate an employee for hurting the corporation’s 
public image on the Internet, or disturbing employer-employee relationships 
and organizational culture? 
A. EMPLOYER ALLEGATIONS OF EMPLOYEE MISCONDUCT OR 
DEFAMATION IN SOCIAL MEDIA POSTINGS WILL RARELY LOSE 
PROTECTION OF THE NLRA 
1. The Atlantic Steel Test 
The NLRB has not made it clear when it will be safe for corporations to 
make employment decisions without facing potential liability under the 
NLRA.148 Despite its reluctance to forfeit an employee’s protection under 
the NLRA, the NLRB has shown that it will apply Atlantic Steel to 
determine whether social media postings will lose that protection.149 In one 
case, a sports bar and restaurant discharged two employees for a 
conversation about the employer’s tax withholding practices when one of 
the employees said the employer was “such an asshole.”150 It was apparent 
that the employees’ comments were “concerted” under the Meyers cases 
since they were made by co-workers sharing “group complaints” and that 
they were “protected” because income tax withholdings are “terms and 
conditions of employment.”151 However, an employer would most likely 
expect these statements to lose protection due to their distasteful, disloyal, 
or defamatory nature.152 The bar owner conveyed this expectation by having 
its attorney send a letter to one of the charging parties stating that “legal 
action would be initiated against her unless she retracted her ‘defamatory’ 
statements regarding the Employer and its principals published to the 
general public on Facebook.”153 
The NLRB found that the employee’s statements did not lose protection 
under the Atlantic Steel test. The factors considered under the Atlantic Steel 
test are “(1) the place of the discussion; (2) the subject matter of the 
                                                                                                                                             
 146. See, e.g., Bay SYS Technologies, 357 N.L.R.B. 28; Hispanics United of Buffalo, 2011 WL 
3894520; Karl Knauz Motors, 2011 WL 4499437; MEMORANDUM OM 11-74, supra note 13; see 
NLRB, http://www.nlrb.gov/news/settlement-reached-case-involving-discharge-facebook 
-comments (last visited Dec. 20, 2011); Trottman, supra note 12.  
 147. See MEMORANDUM OM 11-74, supra note 13.  
 148. See id.  
 149. See, e.g., Hispanics United of Buffalo, 2011 WL 3894520; MEMORANDUM OM 11-74, 
supra note 13. 
 150. MEMORANDUM OM 11-74, supra note 13, at 10. 
 151. Id.  
 152. Id. at 9.  
 153. Id. at 10.  
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discussion; (3) the nature of the employee’s outburst; and (4) whether the 
outburst was, in any way, provoked by an employer’s unfair labor 
practice.”154 The statements did not lose protection because the comments 
were made outside of the workplace while the employee was off-duty, they 
did not disrupt operations or undermine supervisory authority, and the 
nature of the postings were “much less offensive than other behavior found 
protected by the Board.”155 Additionally, the NLRB stated that to prove the 
employee defamed the employer, which would cause the statements to lose 
their protected status, the statements must not only be false, but maliciously 
false. 156  Furthermore, not only did the NLRB find that the employer’s 
allegations of defamation were unfounded, but the threat to sue violated 
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.157 In this case, the employer may have been 
better off if it had actually sued for defamation—“The Board has 
historically distinguished the threat of a lawsuit from the actual filing of a 
lawsuit and has rejected employers’ attempts to extend the First 
Amendment protection accorded to lawsuits to threats to sue where those 
threats, as here, were not incidental to the actual filing of a suit.”158 This 
case demonstrates that when an employee’s social media postings appear to 
disparage the corporation or supervisors of that corporation, those 
statements may still be protected and that threatening to sue is not a good 
idea if the threat is not incidental to actually filing the suit.159 
Thus far in social media cases, the NLRB has been reluctant to apply 
Atlantic Steel in a manner that forfeits employees’ rights under the 
NLRA.160 An employee loses the protection of the NLRA if the activity is 
“maliciously false” or “opprobrious” under the Atlanta Steel test.161 This 
test heavily favors employees, as is exhibited by the NLRB’s position that 
the Act protects an employee’s statements calling a supervisor a 
“scumbag” 162  or an employer’s owner “an asshole” 163  on social media 
platforms.164 Thus, it appears as though inflammatory language on social 
media postings will not lose protection.165 Social media postings critical of 
                                                                                                                                             
 154. Atlantic Steel Co., 245 N.L.R.B. 814, 816 (1979) 
 155. MEMORANDUM OM 11-74, supra note 13, at 9.  
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. at 11.  
 158. Id.  
 159. Id.  
 160. MEMORANDUM OM 11-74, supra note 13, at 10–11; Hispanics United of Buffalo, Inc., No. 
3-CA-27872, 2011 WL 3894520 (N.L.R.B. Div. of Judges, Sept. 2 2011). 
 161. Phillips, supra note 96, at 31 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); 
MEMORANDUM OM 11-74, supra note 13, at 11.  
 162. Phillips, supra note 96, at 31 (citations omitted).  
 163. Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 164. Id. 
 165. An employee was fired for calling the owner of the company that employed him an “F’ing 
mother F’ing,” an “F’ing crook,” and “an asshole,” and that he was stupid, nobody liked him, and 
everyone talked about him behind his back. Plaza Auto Ctr. Inc. and Nick Aguirre, 355 N.L.R.B. 
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an employer already cause increased damage to those employers based on 
the inherent characteristics of the Internet—mainly the public access, 
seeming anonymity, and permanence.166 Protecting inflammatory postings 
will only further expose and damage corporations’ reputations and 
organizational morale. Inflammatory language will more likely catch 
peoples’ eyes on social media, or “go viral,” and give the corporation bad 
publicity.167 Inflammatory comments about the employer or a supervisor 
will also more likely cause schisms at the workplace between the employee 
and management, particularly if the comments are made about a particular 
manager or supervisor. 
2. The Defamation Defense 
Employers will often file a defamation lawsuit against the disciplined 
employee as a back-up plan in case the Board finds that the disciplined 
employee’s statements were protected under the NLRA.168 Employers may 
attempt to do so as a power tactic to scare the employee from attempting to 
defend itself against a defamation claim and cause them to withdraw their 
charge with the NLRB.169 Or, the employer may genuinely believe it is 
being defamed. 170  Employers will be unpleasantly surprised when the 
NLRB decides to apply the heightened “defamation defense” standard to 
social media cases, as it does to other NLRA labor dispute cases.171 
In NLRA labor disputes, courts apply a heightened standard that 
requires a defamation plaintiff (the corporation-employer in this context) to 
show that a defendant’s statements were “a deliberate or reckless untruth” 
and that the statements caused actual harm.172 This differs from the usual 
state law defamation standard that only requires the plaintiff to show that 
“the defendant was negligent in making his or her untruthful statements to a 
third party and does not require demonstrable proof that the statements led 
to actual harm.”173 In Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, Local 114, the 
Supreme Court of the United States further stated that in labor disputes, 
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“[T]he most repulsive speech enjoys immunity [from defamation liability] 
provided it falls short of a deliberate or reckless untruth.” 174  But even 
deliberate or reckless falsities are not actionable defamation claims “unless 
the defamation plaintiff can also prove that these untruths led to actual 
damages.”175 Due to the Supremacy Clause, this federal NLRA standard 
preempts state defamation laws, thus requiring employer defamation claims 
to meet this heightened standard.176 The Supreme Court’s rationale for this 
standard is that allowing states to regulate allegedly defamatory statements 
during a labor dispute would “dampen the ardor of labor debate and 
truncate the free discussion envisioned by the [NLRA].”177 “The Court also 
sought to decrease the likelihood that defamation suits, which sometimes 
lead to ‘excessive damages,’ would be ‘used as weapons of economic 
coercion.’”178 
The Board will likely adopt this standard for defamation claims that 
arise out of social media postings. Facing this mountainous standard, 
employers will be unlikely to succeed on a defamation claim and, therefore, 
should think twice (or three times) before terminating or disciplining an 
employee for what it believes are defamatory social media postings.  
B. DISLOYAL AND DISPARAGING COMMENTS ABOUT AN EMPLOYER 
WILL ALSO RARELY LOSE PROTECTION OF THE NLRA 
The Board will likely adopt the Jefferson Standard approach when 
handling social media cases where an employee allegedly disparages the 
employer. Jefferson Standard attempted to distinguish terminations that 
were unfair labor practices from those that were “for cause.” 179  If the 
termination is for “insubordination, disobedience or disloyalty,” the 
employer has adequate cause for discharge.180 The employee will not be 
protected if his or her comments amount to an “attack” on the corporation 
or “the quality of the company’s product and its business policies, in a 
manner reasonably calculated to harm the company’s reputation and reduce 
its income.”181 There are several factors that the Board and courts have 
traditionally relied upon to remove speech from NLRA protection: 
How closely connected employee comments are to actual labor disputes; 
the timing of the organizational comments (i.e., the more “critical” a time 
for the employer with regards to their relationship with the marketplace, 
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the more likely the speech will be deemed disloyal); the general tone 
(overly harsh, critical, attacking, etc.); the employee’s general motive; and 
the intended audience (the employer’s clients or customers, the general 
public, or other employees).182 
Although the Board will likely apply this standard to social media 
cases,183 the problem again lies in the uncertainty of its application. As one 
commentator put it, “[B]ased on the body of case law decided in the years 
since Jefferson Standard, it is difficult to ascertain what, exactly, amounts 
to the type of disloyalty that will subject employees’ otherwise protected 
organizational speech to discipline.”184 And that ambiguous body of law 
does not yet include social media cases. In social media, disparaging 
comments will have amplified consequences for employers due to the large 
scale, sense of anonymity, and permanent nature of the Internet and social 
media platforms.185 Due to the Board’s history of taking an ad hoc, fact-
specific approach to determining whether employees’ statements reach the 
level of disparagement,186 it is likely that it will continue to do so in the 
social media context. This illustrates the obvious problem of uncertainty for 
both employees and employers as to when social media postings will lose 
or maintain protection. It is the employers’ and employees’ best guess as to 
how the Board will apply Jefferson Standard to the facts surrounding a 
disciplinary action. 
IV. AMENDING THE NLRA WILL MAKE THE NLRB MORE 
EQUIPPED TO HANDLE SOCIAL MEDIA CASES AND 
MITIGATE THE UNCERTAINTY THAT CURRENTLY EXISTS 
FOR EMPLOYERS AND EMPLOYEES 
There are several problems with the NLRA and its inability to keep up 
with the economic and societal realities of today.187 One of those realities is 
that activity on the Internet is invariably different from non-Internet 
communication. 188  Yet, the NLRB continues to apply old law to new 
contexts that it was not created to deal with. 189  In applying Section 7 
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protection to social media postings, the NLRB has failed to consider the 
drastic effects such protection could have on an employer, who can be 
publically criticized—often harshly—without discretion to remedy the 
situation.190 Instead, based on the scant guidance that the NLRB, the ALJs, 
and the Board have given through the social media cases,191 employees will 
not know what postings will be protected by the NLRA, and employers will 
not know when they can discipline employees without fearing litigation 
costs. Therefore, measures must be taken to (1) account for the harsh results 
these cases may have on employers, and (2) mitigate some of the 
uncertainty for both employers and employees. 
A. CODIFY THE LAW REGARDING PROTECTED CONCERTED 
ACTIVITY AND SPECIFY WHEN EMPLOYEES WILL LOSE 
PROTECTION OF THE NLRA 
Congress and state legislatures will often codify the common law that 
develops in a particular area where courts have grappled with a legal 
issue.192 To mitigate the uncertainty of what constitutes protected concerted 
activity in social media, Congress should amend the NLRA and codify the 
type of Internet activity and communication that will constitute concerted 
activity. The old adage of allowing laws to apply in all contexts irrespective 
of technological change may have some legitimacy when technology 
changes so rapidly that the law simply cannot keep up with it. 193  Or, 
applying old law may work if the old technology is similar enough to the 
new technology.194 However, since it appears that the Internet is here to stay 
and is vastly different from its predecessor technologies, establishing labor 
laws that conform to today’s era of Internet communication is vital. 
Congress has successfully passed statutes to deal specifically with Internet 
activity in other areas,195 thus, there is no reason why labor-management 
issues should be any different. 
Congress should look at the types of social media cases (and other 
Internet cases) and pass a statute specifying when postings are concerted. 
Congress can define “concerted” activity along with explanatory comments 
that give examples of Internet and pre-Internet activity that is both 
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“concerted” and not “concerted.” Granted, unexpected disputes will arise 
that do not seamlessly fit into the definition or the comments and the Board 
will be left to determine how to categorize such unexpected activity. But, 
employment disputes tend to repeat themselves, as they did in Hispanics 
United, the Facebook Firing case, Karl Knauz Motors, and Bay SYS 
Technologies,196 and Congress can eliminate uncertainty in a majority of 
these disputes by codifying where the law will stand in these foreseeable 
situations. As a result, employees will know when they can air their feelings 
on social media, blogs, or in an e-mail without fear of adverse action being 
taken against them. Similarly, employers will know when they can 
discipline an employee for potentially harmful comments made via social 
media. 
Further, Congress should codify when employees may lose protection 
under the NLRA. Given the characteristics of the Internet—public access, 
sense of anonymity, permanence—Congress may decide to create limited 
carve-outs from NLRA protection for otherwise protected speech when it is 
made through social media (or, for that matter, any publically-accessible 
Internet posts). For instance, a post may lose protection if it is likely to have 
a significantly more harmful effect on employers than the same non-Internet 
speech would have had. Or, Congress may set a level of egregiousness 
(high or low) where social media posts lose NLRA protection. Congress 
may alternatively set a standard that a social media post will lose protection 
if a reasonable employee should know that the comments are likely to cause 
substantial harm to his or her employer. These proposed legislative changes 
take into account the realities of the Internet and social media era that we 
live in.  
Additionally, the NLRA “was initially conceived of as the free market 
solution to market failures in individual bargaining” and was created to deal 
with the “‘inequality of bargaining power’ between generally weaker-
positioned employees and generally stronger-positioned employers, and 
protecting commerce by guaranteeing employees the right to ‘organize and 
bargain collectively.’”197 Since even the employees who complain via social 
media, like in the Facebook Firing case or Hispanics United, are not likely 
exercising their right to organize or collectively bargain, there is less reason 
to protect those posts when they greatly harm employers. 198  Therefore, 
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Congress should enact some measures to alleviate the harm to employers 
caused by employees’ social media gripes, while at the same time 
protecting the principles of the NLRA that guard employees’ right to 
organize. However, even if Congress simply codifies Jefferson Standard or 
Atlantic Steel, it would do a great service to employers and employees by 
mitigating uncertainty regarding future social media cases.199 
B. TRIPARTITE NATIONAL BODY WITH REGIONAL BOARDS AND 
REDUCED SCOPE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 
A tripartite national body with regional boards would be a structure 
where each region had its own board with three members—one representing 
employers, one representing workers, and one neutral.200 This structure will 
ensure that “each party will have its case presented and understood before a 
sympathetic board member who understands that party’s day-to-day 
concerns.” 201  Such a structure would mimic the War Labor Board and 
Canadian Board202—it would replace the ALJs and the Regional Board’s 
adjudications could similarly be appealed to the National Board as it 
currently exists.203 This tripartite system would “increase the likelihood that 
the practical problems and concerns of both parties are addressed in 
addition to legal issues.”204 The Regional Board’s decision is also more 
likely to be accepted by the losing party since it will have had an 
adjudicator that is aligned with its interests hear the case.205 Further, having 
a regionalized Board will facilitate the parties to “bring about voluntary 
resolution of the dispute, or if necessary, bring the Board decisions closer to 
the parties.”206 
Moreover, the scope of judicial review of National Board decisions 
should be reduced.207 “Board decisions would be reversed or remanded only 
if the Board denied the complainant due process, exceeded its jurisdiction, 
or violated the NLRA.” 208  This will avoid the administrative delays 
experienced under the current Board and would also serve to limit frivolous 
appeals,209 enabling Board precedent on new issues, such as social media 
cases, to be developed more speedily. The tripartite system would also give 
newfound confidence in precedent in this area, because the cases will have 
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been decided by experts in the field that represent the interests and concerns 
of both employees and employers.210 Rather than applying old law to the 
new and distinct social media context, the Regional Boards can develop 
case law to fit the economic and societal realities, while still maintaining 
the original purpose of the Act.  
A tripartite Regional Board will help solve both problems of 
uncertainty and backlash against employers. Even if Congress refuses to 
codify the Board common law into the NLRA, Board precedent in this new 
area of the law will develop rapidly under this tripartite structure with 
reduced judicial review and fewer appeals.211 The Regional Board will be 
close to the parties, have great expertise in the field, and have one member 
essentially representing the interests of each party, eliciting greater trust in 
the common law developed surrounding the issue.212 Therefore, parties will 
be comfortable in relying on the established precedent in social media 
cases—employers will know when social media activity can be 
reprimanded and employees will know when they can air their grievances 
via social media. 
C. EXPAND BOARD REMEDIES 
Congress should also expand the Board’s remedial powers in an effort 
to avoid potential negative implications on union organizing. Currently, the 
Board’s remedial powers—proscribed in Section 10 of the NLRA—are 
relatively limited. 213  The Board’s typical remedy is a cease-and-desist 
order,214 which is essentially a slap on the wrist. The Board also has the 
power to order a “make whole” remedy, which could require an employer 
to reinstate and award back pay to an unlawfully-discharged employee.215  
Although it is unlikely that many of the social media cases have 
involved or will involve employees attempting to organize, it is possible 
that social media will be used to facilitate union organizing.216 And that 
should not be thwarted. The recommended changes in this note are 
designed to solve the problem of applying old Board precedent to a new 
setting involving social media communication. Those changes align with—
and should not hamper—the intent of the Act to protect employees who 
organize to take lawful group action. The NLRA has an expressed interest 
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in protecting labor organizing. 217  Thus, when the Regional Board or 
National Board recognizes a social media case where such organization is 
clearly taking place, the NLRB should issue a mandatory injunction to 
prevent the employer from impeding the employees’ collective action. 
Despite Section 10(j) of the Act, which grants the Board the power to issue 
an injunction, the NLRB “rarely seeks preliminary relief against employer 
unfair labor practices under Section 10(j).” 218  That problem would be 
solved if, in such situations, the NLRB is statutorily obliged to seek an 
immediate injunction to have the employer immediately reinstate the 
discharged employee.  
Furthermore, the Board should have harsher remedies at its disposal, 
such as fines, sanctions, and double back-pay awards for unlawfully 
discharged employees. This will protect employees’ Section 7 rights when 
they are actually being violated, and at the same time protect employers 
from litigations expenses when their employees are not actually exercising 
their organizational rights protected by the NLRA.  
CONCLUSION 
This note has attempted to demonstrate that the NLRB’s 
characterization of social media activity as “protected concerted activity” 
under the NLRA has created uncertainty for employers and employees, and 
does not consider the potentially grave consequences that broadly 
protecting this activity could have on employers. The differences between 
social media and face-to-face or pre-Internet communication— mainly 
public access to social media sites, guise of anonymity on the Internet, and 
the permanent nature of Internet postings—are the reasons why an 
application of old law to new contexts has undesirable results. The most 
viable solution to this problem is to amend the NLRA, which is antiquated 
and unequipped to deal with current societal and economic realities, to 
codify with explanatory comments when activity is “concerted” and when 
otherwise protected activity loses protection in the pre-Internet and Internet 
contexts, to create a tripartite system with a national board and regional 
boards, and to expand Board remedies to protect conduct that truly violates 
employees’ Section 7 rights under the Act. 
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